A Geometric Mania

Last night I noted the Victorian vogue for the ram as a naval weapon. I want to explore a little further some consequences of that.

From at least the time of the Anglo-Dutch Wars (1650s and 1660s) to the Battle of Navarino (1827), naval tactics were determined by the wind. Because more guns could be concentrated on the sides of ships, than at the ends, it was necessary for warships to present their broadsides to the enemy. This meant that the normal battle formation was line ahead - that is each ship followed in a line directly behind the one in front. Previously, the line abreast, with the ships sailing side-by-side, had been preferred, as this had allowed oared galleys the best scope to use their rams.

The introduction of steam allowed warships to maneuver without wind, and by the 1850s, just prior to the development of the ironclad and the reintroduction of the ram, some theorists began speculating on new possibilities for tactics and naval formations.

After the American Civil War, during which much new technology debuted, but without significant tactical innovations, a long debate ensued between different schools of thought. In the Royal Navy, this took the form of arguments for the old line ahead (supplemented as necessary by the line abreast) against what were termed "group" tactics. In these, small groups of three or four ships were deployed in triangles, diamonds, or similar formations to maneuver and fight in a quasi-independent manner during a battle.

This combined with another obsession of the time, the desire to establish the precise turning radius and best speed for each ship in the fleet. It was felt that if these could be determined, then the handling of a squadron on the day of battle be much improved. (The basic issue was that, during the 1860s, 1870s, and 1880s, warship design evolved so quickly that it was rare for more than two ships to have similar characteristics, making it difficult for a squadron to maneuver together.) Edward Reed, designer of most of the early British ironclads, devoted considerable space to problems of turning radius, top speed, and related topics in his 1869 treatise, Our Iron-Clad Ships. He pointed out the difficulties of determining these measurements empirically, showing in effect that both human and technical factors were involved, causing considerable variation from day to day.

Unfortunately, his advice was often ignored. The combination of interest in the new tactics and the obsession with speeds and turning radii led to the sort of geometrical mania that often afflicts military and naval theorists. The result was that various admirals tried out a number of very intricate evolutions for their squadrons, almost as if playing variations on musical themes. Queen Victoria was likely fortunate that these were never put to the test of war. Not only were many of them ill-conceived, but they may have put many of her seamen in peril from her own ships.

Sir George Tryon, Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet, flew his flag in HMS Victoria. It was while practicing one of his pet evolutions, that of having two lines of ships sailing parallel to each other reverse direction by executing a 180-degree turn towards each other, that the Victoria (and Sir George) were lost. (Wikimedia Commons has an animation diagramming the maneuver and collision.)

Tryon either failed to calculate the correct turning radii of the Victoria and Camperdown, or made a mistake in his flag signals, and ignored this when it was pointed out to him. As a result, the ram of Camperdown tore into his flagship, and Victoria (and Sir George) went down. In the heat of battle, there is no telling how many other ships might have been lost in this way. The demise of the ram led capital ships back to more conventional tactics, while the development of long-range gunnery allowed much wider spacing between vessels.